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• Measuring the precision of an estimation function 
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Motivations
• Inferring the probability distribution of a random 
variable 
• Examples of applications in Trust & Security
• How much we can trust an individual or a set of individuals
• Input distribution in a noisy channel to compute the Bayes risk
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Setting and assumptions
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• For simplicity we consider only 
binary random variables  
• honest/dishonest,  secure/insecure,  ... 
• Goal: infer (an approximation of) 
the probability of success 
• Means:  Sequence of n trials. 
Observation (Evidence) :  s , f
X = {succ,fail}
f =# fail = n − s
s =# succ
Pr(succ)=θNielsen, Palamidessi, Sassone
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Using the evidence to infer θ
• The Frequentist method: 
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• The Bayesian method: 
Assume an a priori probability distribution for  θ (representing your partial 
knowledge about θ, whatever the source may be) and combine it with the 
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Bayesian vs Frequentist
• Criticisms to the frequentist approach
• Limited applicability:  sometimes it is not possible to measure the frequencies 
(in this talk we consider the case in which this is possible)
• Eg: what is the probability that my submitted paper will be accepted?
• Misleading evidence: For small samples (small n) we can be unlucky, i.e. get 
unlikely results
• This is less dramatic for the Bayesian approach because the a priori 
distribution reduces the effect of a misleading evidence, provided it is close 
enough to the real distribution
6Nielsen, Palamidessi, Sassone
Inference of Probability Distributions for trust and security
Bayesian vs Frequentist
• Criticisms to the Bayesian approach
• We need to assume an a priori probability distribution; as we usually do 
not know the real distribution, the assumption can be somehow 
arbitrary and differ signiﬁcantly from reality
• Observe that the two approaches give the same 
result as n tends to inﬁnity:  the “true” distribution
• Frequentist approach:  because of the law of large numbers
• Bayes approach:  because the a priori “washes out” for large values of n.
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Bayesian vs Frequentist
The surprising thing is that the Frequentist approach can be worse than the 
Bayesian approach even when the trials give a “good” result, or when we 
consider the average difference (from the “true” θ) wrt all possible results
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The surprising thing is that the Frequentist approach can be worse than the 
Bayesian approach even when the trials give a “good” result, or when we 
consider the average difference (from the “true” θ) w.r.t. all possible results
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• We will see that Fc(s,n) = (s+1)/(n+2) corresponds to one of the possible 
Bayesian approaches. 
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• We will see that Fc(s,n) = (s+1)/(n+2) corresponds to one of the possible 
Bayesian approaches. 
• Of course, if the “true” θ is different from 1/2 then  Fc can be worse than F 
• And, of course, the problem is that we don’t know what θ is (the value θ is 
exactly what we are trying to ﬁnd out!).
• However, Fc is still better than F if we consider the average distance wrt all 
possible θ ∈ [0,1], assuming that they are all equally likely (i.e. that θ has a 
uniform distribution)
• In fact we can prove that, under a suitable notion of  “difference”, and for θ 
uniformly distributed, Fc  is the best function of the kind  G(s,n) = (s+t)/(n+m)
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A Bayesian approach
• Assumption:  θ is the generic value of a continuous random variable ƨ 
whose probability density is a Beta distribution with (unknown) parameters 
Ǌ, Ǎ
• Note that the uniform distribution is a particular case of Beta distribution, 
with Ǌ	 , Ǎ	 
• B	Ǌ, Ǎ
	 can be seen as the a posteriori probability density of ƨ	 given by a 
uniform a priori (principle of maximum entropy) and a trial sequence 




Γ(σ)Γ(ϕ) θσ−1(1 − θ)ϕ−1
where Γ is the extension of the factorial function
i.e. Γ(n)=( n − 1)! for n natural numberNielsen, Palamidessi, Sassone
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Examples of Beta Distribution
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Examples of Beta Distribution
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Other examples of Beta Distribution
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The Bayesian Approach
• Assume an a priori probability distribution for  Θ (representing our 
partial knowledge about Θ, whatever the source may be) and combine 
it with the evidence, using Bayes’ theorem, to obtain the a posteriori 
probability distribution
• One possible deﬁnition for the estimation function (algorithm) is the mean of 
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The Bayesian Approach
• Since the distribution of Θ is assumed to be a beta distribution B(Ǌ, Ǎ
, it is natural 
to take as a priori a function of the same class, i.e. B(ƹƺ

• In general we don’t know the “real parameters” Ǌ, Ǎ	 hence ƹƺ may be 
different from Ǌ, Ǎ
• The likelihood Pr( s |ǀ) is a binomial, i.e. 
• The Beta distribution is a conjugate of the binomial, which means that the application 







θs (1 − θ)f
Pd(θ | s)=B(α + s,β + f)Nielsen, Palamidessi, Sassone
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The Bayesian Approach
• Summarizing, we are considering three probability density functions for ƨ:
• B(Ǌ,Ǎ)   :  the “real” distribution of ƨ
• B(ƹ,ƺ)   :  the a priori (the distribution of ƨ	 up to our best knowledge)
• B(s +ƹ, f +ƺ)   :  the a posteriori 




s + f + α + β
=
s + α
n + α + βNielsen, Palamidessi, Sassone
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The Bayesian Approach
• The frequentist method can be 
seen as the limit of the Bayesian 
mean-based algorithms, for 
ƹƺˠ0
• Intuitively, the Bayesian mean-
based algorithms give the best 
result for ƹ(ƹ	 ƺ
	 	 ǀ	 and	 
ƹƺˠ∞
• How can we compare two 
Bayesian algorithms in general, 
i.e. independently of ǀ?  
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Measuring the precision of Bayesian algorithms
• Deﬁne a “difference’’ D(A(n,s),ǀ) (possibly a distance, but not necessarily. It 
does not need to be symmetric)
• non-negative
• zero iff  A(n,s) =ǀ
• what else?
• Consider the expected value DE(A,n,ǀ) of D(A(n,s),ǀ) with respect to the 
likelihood (the conditional probability of s given ǀ)
• Risk of A : the expected value R(A,n) of DE(A,n,ǀ) with respect to the 
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Measuring the precision of Bayesian Algorithms
• Note that the deﬁnition of  “Risk of A” is general, i.e. it is a natural deﬁnition 
for any estimation algorithm (not necessarily Bayesian or mean-based) 
• What other conditions should D satisfy? 
• It seems natural to require that D be such that R(A,n) has a minimum (for all 
n’s) when the a priori distribution coincides with the “true’’ distribution
• It is not obvious that such D exists
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Measuring the precision of Bayesian Algorithms
We have considered the following candidates for D(x,y) (all of which can be 
extended to the n-ary case): 
• The norms:  
• |x - y|
• |x - y|2
• ...
• |x - y|k
• ...
• The Kullback-Leibler divergence
22
DKL((y,1 − y) ￿ (x,1 − x)) = y log2
y
x
+ (1 − y)log2
1 − y
1 − xNielsen, Palamidessi, Sassone
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Measuring the precision of Bayesian algorithms
• Theorem. For the mean-based Bayesian algorithms, with a priori B(ƹƺ), 
we have that the condition is satisﬁed (i.e. the Risk is minimum when ƹƺ 
coincide with the parameters Ǌ, Ǎ	 of the “true” distribution), by the 
following functions: 
• The 2nd norm (x - y)2  
• The Kullback-Leibler divergence 
• We ﬁnd it very surprising that the condition is satisﬁed by these two very 
different functions, and not by any of the other norms  |x - y|k  for kÛ2
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D(x,y)=( x − y)2
DE(Aα,β,5,1/2)
σ =1 ,ϕ =1
n =5 ,θ =1 /2 n =5
For the Kullback-Leibler divergence the plots are similar,  but 
much more steep, and they diverge for	 ƹˠ0 or ƺˠ0
R(Aα,β,5)Nielsen, Palamidessi, Sassone
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Work in progress
• Note that for the 2nd norm D(x,y) = (x-y)2 the average DE is a distance. This 
contrasts with the case of D(x,y) = DKL(y||x) and makes the ﬁrst more 
appealing.
• How robust is the theorem that “certiﬁes” that the 2nd-norm-based DE is a 
“good” distance? In particular: 
• Does it extend to the case of multi-valued random variables?
• Note that in the multi-valued case the likelihood is a multinomial, the 
conjugate a priori is a Dirichelet and the D is the Euclidian distance 
(squared)
• What are the possible applications? 
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Possible applications (work in progress)
• We can use DE to compare two different estimation algorithms.
• Mean-based vs other ways of selecting a ǀ
• Bayesian vs non-Bayesian
• In more complicated scenarios there may be different Bayesian mean-
based algorithms. Example:  noisy channel.
• DE induces a metric on distributions.  Bayes’ equations deﬁne 
transformations on this metric space from the a priori to the a posteriori. 
We intend to study the properties of such transformations in the hope that 
they will reveal interesting properties of the corresponding Bayesian 
methods,  independent of the a priori. 
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